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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate how the presence of the COVID-19 pandemicthe increase
in the probability of death, following Blanchard and Fischer (1989)may a¤ect growth
and welfare in a scale-invariant R&D-based Schumpeterian model. Without money, the
increase in the probability of death has no e¤ect on long-run growth and a negative
e¤ect on welfare. By contrast, when money is introduced via the cash-in-advance
constraint on consumption, the increase in the probability of death decreases long-run
growth and welfare under elastic labor supply. Calibration shows that the quantitative
e¤ect of an increase in the probability of death on welfare is much larger compared to
that on growth.
JEL Classication: E52 O42 O47
Keywords: the COVID-19 pandemic; cash-in-advance constraint on consumption;
Schumpeterian model
I am grateful to the Editor of Frontiers of Economics in China, Professor Zhiqi Chen, for constructive
comments that substantially improved the paper. I am also grateful to Angus Chu for critical comments. I
also thank Meng Sun for helpful discussion. All the errors are my own.
yHe: Professor, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Eco-
nomics, No. 39 South College Road, Haidian District, Beijing, China. 100081. Email: qichunhe@gmail.com,
heqichun@cufe.edu.cn.
1
1 Introduction
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, scholars began to study the long-term consequences of
pandemics (e.g., Barro et al., 2020; Jordà et al., 2020). For instance, Barro et al. (2020) nd
that the Spanish Flu caused a 6% and 8% decrease in GDP and consumption, respectively,
but the long-run growth rate is not a¤ected. The existence of level but not growth e¤ects is
expected because the pandemic eventually disappeared. However, it is intriguing to study
the case in which the pandemic would not disappear. In this paper we give it a simple
try. Following Blanchard and Fischer (1989), we model the presence of the COVID-19
pandemic as the increase in the xed probability of death. We use a scale-invariant R&D-
based Schumpeterian growth model based on Chu and Cozzi (2014).
Our nding is as follows. Without money, an increase in the probability of death has no
e¤ect on long-run growth and a negative e¤ect on welfare. When money is introduced via
the CIA (cash-in-advance) constraint on consumption, an increase in the probability of death
reduces long-run growth and welfare. The reason is due to the lack of insurance market for
real balance.
Calibration shows that the e¤ect of an increase in the probability of death on welfare is
larger compared to that on growth. As the probability of death increases from 0.0128 to
0.0136, 0.0208 and 0.0338 (corresponding to an increase in mortality of 0.08%, 0.8%, and
2.1%; 2.1% is the worse-case scenario of the Spanish u in Barro et al., 2020), the annual
growth decreases from 1.80% to 1.80%, 1.79% and 1.77%, respectively. The welfare is not
directly comparable. Under the same change in scenarios, the decrease in initial consumption
is 0.05%, 0.34%, and 1.37%, respectively, and the life expectancy decreases from 78 years
to 73.5, 48 and 29.6 years, respectively. Therefore, the welfare losses are substantial if the
pandemic does not disappear. For a given probability of death, there are signicant growth
and welfare gains from monetary contraction, and the gains from monetary contraction
remain similar for the probability of death of very di¤erent magnitudes.
Our study relates to the literature on health, human capital, fertility and mortality in
growth models (see, Chu, Cozzi and Liao, 2013; Prettner, 2013, 2014; He, 2018a,b,c), and
that on ination and growth (e.g., Dotsey and Sarte, 2000; He and Zou, 2016; Chu et al.,
2019). Related to our study, scholars have studied the e¤ects of longevity on long-run growth
in R&D-based growth models (e.g., Prettner and Trimborn, 2012; Prettner, 2013, 2014).
Prettner and Trimborn (2012), Prettner (2013), and Prettner (2014) all model longevity as
the decrease in mortality (i.e., a decrease in the probability of death). These studies all nd
that a decrease in the probability of death promotes long-run growth in per capita output in
endogenous growth models or semi-endogenous growth models where the size of population
matters for growth. By contrast, we use the Schumpeterian model with no scale e¤ects
(see e.g., Segerstrom, 1998, for discussions of scale-e¤ects), where the share of population
allocated between R&D and manufacturing, rather than total population, matters for long-
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run growth. Additionally, we study the role of monetary policy.
Our study also relates to the most recent studies on the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., Manski
and Molinari, 2020; Atkeson, 2020; Acemoglu et al., 2020, and references therein). For
instance, Manski and Molinari (2020) analyze data from Illinois, New York, and Italy, over
the period March 16 to April 24, 2020 and nd that the infection rate might be substantially
higher than reported, but the infection fatality rates are substantially lower than reported:
We nd that the cumulative infection rates as of April 24, 2020, for Illinois,
New York, and Italy are, respectively, bounded in the intervals [0.004, 0.525],
[0.017, 0.618], and [0.006, 0.471]. Further analyzing the infection-fatality ratio,
we nd that as of April 24 it can be bounded, for Illinois, New York, and Italy,
respectively, in the intervals [0, 0.033], [0.001, 0.049], and [0.001, 0.077]. The
upper bounds are substantially lower than the death rates among conrmed
infected individuals, which were, respectively, 0.045, 0.059, and 0.134 on April
24.
Acemoglu et al. (2020) focus on the e¤ects of testing policy on voluntary social distancing
and the spread of an infection. Testing enables the isolation of infected individuals, but
greater testing also reduces voluntary social distancing, thereby yielding a non-monotone
e¤ect of testing on infections. Our study takes the infection rate and the infection-fatality
ratio as given and focuses on the growth and welfare e¤ects. Our study can be improved by
endogenizing the probability of death with testing and voluntary social distancing.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the Schumpeterian model without
money. Section 3 presents the monetary Schumpeterian model and calibrates the model to
show the quantitative e¤ects. Section 4 concludes.
2 Schumpeterian Model with the COVID-19 Pandemic
Following Blanchard and Fischer (1989), we model the COVID-19 pandemic as the increase
in the probability of death. The Schumpeterian model follows Chu and Cozzi (2014).
2.1 Households
Each individual faces a constant probability of death per unit of time throughout life. The
probability of dying is independent of age.
There is a unit continuum of identical households, which have a lifetime utility function
U =
Z
1
0
e (+p)t [ln (ct) +  ln (1  lt)] dt, (1)
where ct is per capita real consumption of nal goods and lt is per capita labor supply at
time t.  is the rate of time preference; p > 0 captures the constant but increased probability
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of death due to the COVID-19 pandemic;  > 0 is the taste for leisure (note that it is not
the elasticity of labor supply).
The population size is xed at L. This is achieved by assuming that the size of new cohort
is Lp, which means the fertility rate equals the death rate. Each household maximizes its
lifetime utility given in equation (1) subject to the asset-accumulation equation given by

at = (rt + p) at + wtlt   ct, (2)
where at is the real value of equity shares in monopolistic intermediate-goods rms owned
by each member of the household; rt and wt are the rate of real interest and the wage,
respectively; p is the insurance premium. The insurance premium is equal to the death
of probability, which is ensured by free entry and zero prot in the insurance industry
(see Yaari, 1965; Blanchard and Fischer, 1989). Although the shock of death hits each
individual/household randomly, there is no aggregate uncertainty. Therefore, there is scope
for insurance as highlighted in Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 116): He would be better
o¤ if he could sell the claim on his wealth in the event he dies, in exchange for command
over resources while he is alive. With free entry and zero prot in the insurance industry,
the insurance company pays a xed premium in the amount of p (the probability of death)
per unit of time to each person alive.
Using Hamiltonian, we can derive the optimality condition for consumption
1
ct
= t, (3)
where t is the Hamiltonian co-state variable on (2). Using (3), we rewrite the optimal
condition for labor supply as
lt = 1 
ct
wt
. (4)
The Euler equation is
 

t
t
= rt   . (5)
Labor is either used in producing intermediate goods (manufacturing) or R&D. The labor
market clearing condition is Lx;t + Lr;t = ltLt, where Lx;t and Lr;t are the total employment
in manufacturing and R&D, respectively.
2.2 Production and Innovation
The production function of nal-goods rms is
yt = exp
Z 1
0
ln xt (j) dj

, (6)
where xt (j) denotes intermediate goods j 2 [0; 1]. The perfectly competitive nal goods
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rms maximize their prot, taking the price of each intermediate good j, denoted pt (j), as
given, which yields the demand function for xt (j):
xt (j) = yt=pt (j) . (7)
There is a unit continuum of industries producing di¤erentiated intermediate goods.
Each industry is temporarily dominated by an industry leader until the arrival of the next
innovation, and the owner of the new innovation becomes the next industry leader. The
leader in industry j has the following production function:
xt(j) = 
qt(j)Lx;t(j), (8)
where Lx;t(j) is the production labor in industry j;  > 1 is the step size of innovation; qt(j)
is the number of productivity improvements that have occurred in industry j as of time t.
Standard Bertrand price competition leads to a prot-maximizing price pt (j) determined by
a markup  over the marginal cost mct(j) = wt=qt(j). The amount of monopolistic prot is
t (j) =

   1


pt (j) xt (j) =

   1


yt. (9)
The labor income from production is
wtLx;t(j) =

1


pt (j) xt (j) =

1


yt. (10)
We denote by vt (j) the value of the monopolistic rm in industry j. In a symmetric
equilibrium, vt (j) = vt. The no-arbitrage condition for vt is
rtvt = t +

vt   tvt, (11)
where t is the arrival rate of the next innovation.
The zero-expected-prot condition of R&D rm k 2 [0; 1] in each industry is
t (k) vt = wtLr;t(k), (12)
where Lr;t(k) is the amount of labor hired by R&D rm k, and t (k) (the rm-level innovation
rate per unit time) is t (k) =
'
L
Lr;t(k), where ' is a constant. This assumption eliminates
the scale e¤ects (see discussions of scale e¤ects in Laincz and Peretto, 2006; Segerstrom,
1998). The aggregate arrival rate of innovation is
t =
Z 1
0
t (k) dk =
'
L
Lr;t = 'lr;t, (13)
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where lr;t is the share of labor employed in the R&D sector. Similarly, the share of labor in
production is lx;t = Lx;t=L.
2.3 Balanced Growth Path
The dynamics of the model remains similar to that in Chu and Cozzi (2014): the economy
immediately jumps to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth path on which each
variable grows at a constant rate. Plugging equation (8) into (6), we have
yt = exp
Z 1
0
qt (j) dj ln 

Lx = exp
Z t
0
vdv ln 

Lx = ZtLx, (14)
where Zt  exp
R t
0
vdv ln 

is the level of aggregate technology. The growth rate of Zt is
gz = t ln  = 'lr;t ln . (15)
On the balanced growth path, (14) yields gy = gz. The output market clearing condition
implies that ct and yt must grow at the same rate: gc = gy. Therefore, the balanced growth
rate gt (the growth rate of per capita consumption or output) is the one given in (15).
Using

vt=vt = gt, we rewrite equation (11) as t = (+ )wtLr;t, where we have used
(12). Further using equations (9), (10), and (13), we have
(   1) lx;t = lr;t + ='. (16)
Combining ct = yt=L and (10), we have ct = wtlx;t. Now the labor market clearing
condition becomes
lr;t + lx;t = lt = 1  lx;t. (17)
Equations (16)(17) solve for flr;t; lx;tg as
lx =
1 + ='
 (1 + )
, (18)
lr =
(   1) (1 + =')
 (1 + )
 

'
. (19)
Proposition 1 The probability of death has no e¤ect on long-run growth. By contrast, an
increase in the time discount factor  decreases long-run growth. Moreover, an increase in
the probability of death decreases welfare.
Proof. Equations (18) and (19) show that both R&D labor and manufacturing labor are
not functions of the probability of death. Therefore, long-run growth does not depend on
the probability of death. Moreover, using (19), we have @lr=@ < 0, therefore, R&D labor
and thereby long-run growth would decrease in the time discount factor .
5
We have c0 = Z0lx;0, where Z0 is the aggregate technology at time 0. Imposing balanced
growth on (1) yields
U =
1
+ p

ln (lx;0) +
g
+ p
+  ln(1  l)

, (20)
where we normalize Z0 to 1. Both R&D labor and manufacturing labor (and thereby total
labor supply l) are not functions of the probability of death. Therefore, (19) shows that
welfare is decreasing in p. Q.E.D.
Although Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 117) state: The e¤ect of the exponential
probability of the death assumption is simply to increase the individuals rate of time pref-
erence, the e¤ect of an increase in the probability of death on long-run growth di¤ers from
that of an increase in the time discount factor. The intuition is as follows.
In our Schumpeterian model, two conditions pin down the equilibrium: the labor market
clearing condition (17) and the free labor mobility condition (16). An increase in the time
discount factor has no e¤ect on labor supply, as seen in (17). An increase in the time discount
factor means consumers become less patient, which pushes consumers to substitute saving
with current consumption, shifting labor away from R&D to manufacturing, as seen in (16).
As a result, long-run growth decreases. By contrast, the increase in the probability of death
does not a¤ect the two conditions, ending up having no e¤ect on long-run growth. This result
holds because we use the scale-invariant R&D growth model. In semi-endogenous growth
models where the size of population matters for growth, Prettner and Trimborn (2012) show
that the probability of death (longevity) a¤ects growth.
Concerning welfare, although the initial consumption and its growth rate are independent
of the probability of death, the e¤ective discount factor becomes (+ p). Therefore, welfare
decreases as p increases. This is understandable because the life expectancy is 1
p
. An increase
in p reduces life expectancy, decreasing expected discounted utility (i.e., welfare).
Nevertheless, the prediction that the probability of death has no e¤ect on long-run growth
does not hold up in a monetary economy, as shown in Section 3.
3 A Monetary Economy
We introduce money via the CIA on consumption, following Clower (1967) and Lucas (1980).
3.1 Consumers
Each household maximizes its lifetime utility given in (1) subject to

at +

mt = (rt + p) at + wtlt   ct   tmt +  t, (21)
where mt is the real money balance held by each person, and t (the ination rate) is the
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cost of holding money. Each individual receives a lump-sum transfer of seigniorage revenue
 t. The CIA constraint is given by ct  mt.
Using Hamiltonian (see Appendix I for derivation), we can derive the optimality condition
for consumption
1
ct
= t (1 + it + p) , (22)
where t is the Hamiltonian co-state variable on (2), and it = t + rt (the Fisher equation)
is the nominal interest rate. The appearance of the probability of death in (22) causes the
di¤erence in predictions. We will explain the intuition later on. The optimal condition for
labor supply becomes
lt = 1 
ct (1 + it + p)
wt
. (23)
The Euler equation is still (5).
3.2 Monetary Authority
The monetary authority controls the nominal money supply, denoted Mt, which is equiva-
lent to the case in which the nominal interest rate is chosen as the policy instrument. In
equilibrium, the binding CIA constraint delivers

mt=mt =

ct=ct. Combining (22) and (5)
yields

ct=ct = rt . We have dened it = t+rt. Therefore,

M t=Mt = it . The monetary
authority rebates the seigniorage revenue back to households. The per capita seigniorage
revenue is  t =

M t= (PtL). The per capita real money balance is mt = Mt= (PtL), where
Pt is the price level of the nal goods and

P t=Pt = t. Therefore,

mt=mt =

M t=Mt   t.
Therefore, we have  t =

mt + tmt.
3.3 The E¤ects of the COVID-19 Pandemic
Now the labor market clearing condition becomes
lr;t + lx;t = lt = 1   (1 + i+ p) lx;t. (24)
Given a xed nominal interest rate, equations (16) and (24) solve for the unique and
stationary pair flr; lxg as
lx =
1 + ='
 [1 +  (1 + i+ p)]
, (25)
lr =
(   1) (1 + =')
 [1 +  (1 + i+ p)]
 

'
. (26)
Proposition 2 In this monetary economy with a xed nominal interest rate i, an increase
in the probability death reduces long-run growth and welfare under elastic labor supply. By
contrast, it has no e¤ect on long-run growth and a negative e¤ect on welfare under inelastic
labor supply.
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Proof. Equations (25) and (26) show that both R&D labor and manufacturing labor are
decreasing functions of the probability of death p. Therefore, long-run growth decreases in
the probability of death p. Using Proposition 1, now the increase in p has an additional neg-
ative e¤ect on welfare through decreasing the initial consumption and the balanced growth
rate. Therefore, welfare is still decreasing in p. Under inelastic labor supply (i.e.,  = 0), it is
obvious that both R&D labor and manufacturing labor are not functions of the probability
of death p, neither is the balanced growth rate. However, an increase in the probability of
death p still raises the e¤ective discount factor to (+ p), decreasing welfare. Q.E.D.
The results in Proposition 2 are in contrast to those in the same model without money.
For intuition, we still resort to the two above-mentioned conditions. The increase in the prob-
ability of death still does not change the arbitrage between consumption and saving and that
between working in R&D and working in manufacturing (i.e., the labor reallocation e¤ect is
still absent). Nevertheless, in the monetary economy, it does a¤ect the consumption-leisure
choices that a¤ects labor supply, as seen in (24). And it reduces labor supply through the
consumption-leisure choice, thereby decreasing both R&D labor and manufacturing labor.
This in turn decreases long-run growth and welfare. However, the consumption-leisure choice
e¤ect is absent under inelastic labor supply.
3.4 Further Discussions on the Mechanism
There are two crucial reasons for the di¤erent predictions in Propositions 1 and 2. The rst
is the individual uncertainty of death. If there exists a representative household with a xed
size L, then household members can pool together the risk from death. Because there is no
aggregate uncertainty, the household simply transfers the wealth (equity plus money) of those
who died to the new cohort. However, there is an innite amount of identical households.
The inter-generational transfer within households is impossible because the shock of death
hits each individual/household randomly. Therefore, there has to be a market solution or
scope for insurance as highlighted in Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 116): He would
be better o¤ if he could sell the claim on his wealth in the event he dies, in exchange for
command over resources while he is alive. The insurance company pays a xed premium
in the amount of p (the probability of death) per unit of time to each person alive.
The second reason is that there is no such market solution/insurance for real balance.
Suppose there exists an insurance company for real balance as well, which is equivalent to
the case in which the insurance contract is written on total wealth (at +mt) in stead of on
real assets at: the asset-accumulation equation becomes

at +

mt = rtat + wtlt   ct   tmt + p (at +mt) +  t. (27)
In this case, the per capita lump-sum transfer of the seigniorage revenue would become
 t =

mt + tmt   pmt. As discussed, due to the random shock to individuals, the equity
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and real balance of those who died cannot be transferred within households, and they have
to be reallocated across households through other mechanisms. Now two situations would
happen. First, there is no insurance market for real balance (further discussed below), and
Proposition 2 would hold. Second, if the insurance contract is written on total wealth (i.e.,
(27) holds), then it would relax the CIA constraint on consumption to ct  mt + pmt.
Relaxing the CIA constraint would end up increasing growth.
In summary, in the monetary economy, the increase in the probability of death would
impact negatively or positively (depending on the institutional arrangements) on growth.
By contrast, it would have no e¤ect on long-run growth in models without money. We be-
lieve the negative e¤ect is more plausible. When the real balance from those who died is
collected by the government, the government uses a lump-sum transfer mechanism. Con-
cerning seigniorage, the government treats each individual alive equally. This di¤ers from
the proportional pricing mechanism of the insurance market for equity. Additionally, it is
much easier to enforce. The government does not need to collect the real balance of those
who died, and it simply prints more at money in the same amount.
3.5 Quantitative Analysis
Our model has the following set of structural parameters f; p; ; '; g. We set the discount
rate  to a conventional value of 0.04. The expected life expectancy is 1=p. Therefore, we
follow Prettner and Trimborn (2012) to set p = 0:0128 (life expectancy is 78 years) to be
the benchmark. We need three conditions to pin down the values of f; '; g. The rst
condition is the long-run GDP per capita growth of 1.8% in advanced countries. Second, we
follow Chu, Cozzi and Liao (2013) to set the equilibrium R&D share of GDP to 0.03 for the
US. Third, the standard moment of l = 0:3 is used. Now we pin down the values of f; '; g
by solving the following three equations:
g = ' (ln ) lr = 0:018, (28)
wtLr=yt = lr= (lx) = 0:03, (29)
lr + lx = 0:3. (30)
We calibrate the annual nominal interest as i = 0:099 for the US (which is calculated as
i = + + g = +0:04+ 0:02, and the sample mean of annual ination in the US is 3.92%
during 1960-2014 in the Penn World Table 9.0). Now solving equations (28)-(30) yields the
values of f; '; g to be f2:09; 61:01; 1:033g.
Barro et al. (2020) show that u-related deaths in 1918-1920 were 2.1 percent of world
population. The WHO (World Health Organization) data shows that the COVID-19 pan-
demic caused a death rate of 4.3% of infected population for the World (585,727 deaths
and 13,616,593 conrmed cases as of July 18, 2020) and 5.4% for China (4,651 deaths and
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85,775 conrmed cases as of July 18, 2020).1 As discussed in the introduction, Manski and
Molinari (2020) nd that the upper bounds of cumulative infection rates as of April 24, 2020,
for Illinois, New York, and Italy are, respectively, 0.525, 0.618, and 0.471. Therefore, we
consider an increase in the probability of death by 0.021 as the worst-case scenario. Barro
et al. state: Other inuenza outbreaks with global reach had much lower mortality rates
as a share of the global population, including by rst place of registry: Siberia (1889-90) at
0.08%, East Asia (1957-58) at 0.07%, and Hong Kong (1968-69) at 0.03%. Therefore, we
consider a range of values for the probability of death p 2 f0:0136; 0:0208; 0:0338g, corre-
sponding to an increase in mortality of 0.08%, 0.8% and 2.1%, respectively. The calibration
results are presented in Table 1.
First, the e¤ects of the probability of death p on welfare are larger compared to those on
growth. For instance, when the nominal interest rate is xed at 9.9% annually, Columns 1.1,
1.3, 1.5 and 1.7 illustrate that, as p increases from 0.0128 to 0.0136, 0.0208 and 0.0338, the
annual growth rate would decrease from 1.80% (the benchmark) to 1.80%, 1.79% and 1.77%,
respectively. The growth e¤ects are not very large. However, because of the change in units,
the welfare for di¤erent p is not comparable. Nevertheless, as the growth rates and initial
consumption levels do not decrease much as p increase, we can simply use the life expectancy
for comparison. As p increases from 0.0128 to 0.0136, 0.0208 and 0.0338, the decrease
in initial consumption is 0.05%, 0.34%, and 1.37%, respectively, and the life expectancy
decreases from 78 years to 73.5, 48 and 29.6 years, respectively. Therefore, the welfare loss
mainly comes from the substantial decrease in life expectancy when the probability of death
increases tenfold, despite that the decrease in initial consumption also increases tenfold. In
sum, the welfare losses are substantial if the pandemic does not disappear. Therefore, despite
of the small growth loss and moderate consumption decrease, the shortened life expectancy
indicates that we need to ght the pandemic.
Second, for a given p, there are signicant growth and welfare gains when reducing the
nominal interest rate from 9.9% to zero. Columns 1.1 and 1.2 (our benchmark) indicate
that reducing the nominal interest rate from 9.9% to zero, the annual growth rate would
increase from 1.8% to 1.93%, and the welfare gain U is equivalent to a permanent increase
in consumption of 2.84%. The growth and welfare gains from the same amount of monetary
contraction remain very similar for p of very di¤erent magnitudes.
1For details, please see https://covid19.who.int/.
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Table 1: Calibration results
Column number
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
f; ; ; 'g = f0:04; 2:09; 1:033; 61:01g
p = 0:0128 0:0136 0:0208 0.0338
benchmark
i 9.9% 0% 9.9% 0% 9.9% 0% 9.9% 0%
lx 0.291 0.310 0.291 0.310 0.290 0.309 0.287 0.306
lr 0.0090 0.0097 0.0090 0.0097 0.0090 0.0096 0.0089 0.0095
g 1.80% 1.93% 1.80% 1.93% 1.79% 1.92% 1.77% 1.90%
c -0.05% -0.34% -1.37%
1
p
78.1 73.5 48.1 29.6
U n/a 2.84% n/a 2.80% n/a 2.53% n/a 3.67%
Note: i is the nominal interest rate; lx and lr are manufacturing labor and
R&D labor, respectively; g is the growth rate of per capita output;
c is the percentage change in initial consumption. 1=p is the life expectancy.
U is the welfare gain (equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption).
4 Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic has greatly changed our life and the way we organize economic ac-
tivities (e.g., online meetings and teaching become popular). Additionally, it has caused more
than a half million deaths (and the number is still increasing, see https://covid19.who.int/
for updated data). In this paper, we take a rst step to evaluate the potential economic
outcome of the pandemic.
Specically, we investigate how the presence of the COVID-19 pandemicthe increase
in the probability of death, following Blanchard and Fischer (1989)may a¤ect growth and
welfare in a scale-invariant R&D-based Schumpeterian model. Our results are as follows.
Without money, the increase in the probability of death has no e¤ect on long-run growth and
a negative e¤ect on welfare. By contrast, when money is introduced via the CIA constraint on
consumption, the increase in the probability of death decreases long-run growth and welfare
under elastic labor supply. Calibration shows that the quantitative e¤ect of an increase in
the probability of death on welfare is much larger compared to that on growth.
We study the case where the pandemic will not disappear. If the pandemic disappears, the
model becomes the standard Schumpeterian model and there are no long-run growth e¤ects
of the pandemic. Our model may be too simple to capture the necessary elements of the
COVID-19 pandemic. We follow Blanchard and Fischer (1989) to assume the probability
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of death is independent of age for tractability, but the old cohorts are hit the hardest.
Additionally, we do not consider health expenditures and time spent ghting the pandemic.
Obviously, the time spent ghting the pandemic would decrease total labor supplied to R&D
and production, decreasing long-run growth and welfare. Moreover, the short-run e¤ects of
lockdown should also deserve attention. We leave these to future research.
APPENDIX I: HOUSEHOLDS DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION
Households Hamiltonian function is
Ht = ln ct +  ln (1  lt) + t [(rt + p) at + wtlt   ct   tmt +  t] + vt (mt   ct) ,
where t is the co-state variable on (2); vt is the Lagrangian multiplier for the CIA constraint.
The rst-order conditions include
@Ht
@ct
=
1
ct
  t   vt = 0, (31)
@Ht
@lt
=  

1  lt
+ twt = 0, (32)
@Ht
@at
= t (rt + p) = (+ p)t  

t, (33)
@Ht
@mt
=  tt + vt = (+ p)t  

t, (34)
Combining (33) and (34) yields vt = t (rt + t + p) = t (it + p), where we dene it =
rt + t. Plugging this condition into (31) yields
1
ct
= t (1 + it + p) , (35)
which is (22) in the main text. Rewriting (32) yields the optimal condition for labor supply

1  lt
= wtt, (36)
which combines with (35) yields (23) in the main text. Rewriting (33) as
 

t
t
= rt    (37)
yields the intertemporal optimality condition.
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